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ESSAY

The Impact of International Law on the
Transformation of China‘s Perception of the
World: A Lesson from History
LI ZHAOJIE (JAMES LI)†

INTRODUCTION
A nation‘s attitude toward international law stems from its world
outlook. In this respect, China is no exception. But what makes China
different from other nations is its unique historical experience. The
legacy of history shapes the present. We make our own history not
just as we please, but only ―under circumstances directly
encountered, given, and transmitted from the past.‖1 History plays a
particularly important role in China.2
Anyone taking a brief look at modern Chinese history will find a
broad spectrum of earth-shaking and kaleidoscopic changes in the
modern nation-building process. In the space of one and a half
centuries, China was reduced by foreign imperialism from its own
―Middle Kingdom‖ at the center of the universe to a semi-colonial
society.3 China then emerged as an independent republic and
†

Professor of Law, Tsinghua University School of Law, Beijing China. This author is
greatly indebted to the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law for its
kind invitation to participate in China, Taiwan and International Law: A Symposium in
Honor of Professor Hungdah Chiu on October 6, 2011. This essay is dedicated to the late
Professor Hungdah Chiu. Professor Chiu was an eminent and revered international law
scholar. Throughout his life, he made tremendous, multi-dimensional and lasting
contributions to the teaching, study, and dissemination of international law. His most
prominent and lasting legacy is his role in promoting peaceful development of the crossstrait relations between Taiwan and Mainland China.
1. Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, reprinted in KARL MARX &
FRIEDRICH ENGELS, BASIC WRITINGS ON POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 320 (Lewis S. Feuer ed.,
1959).
2. SAMUEL S. KIM, China and the World in Theory and Practice, in CHINA AND THE
WORLD: CHINESE FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 12 (1994).
3. John K. Fairbank, Introduction to THE CHINESE WORLD ORDER 1, 2–5 (John K.
Fairbank ed., 1970).
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eventually became a major world power. Concomitant with such
great changes was the radical and fundamental transformation of the
Chinese global outlook from a Sino-centric one based on
Confucianism to modern Chinese nationalism, which embraces the
idea of sovereign equality and independence.4
What is the leitmotif is that cuts broadly across the process of
such transformation? Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, a distinguished historian,
observed that this transformation is certainly not a passive response
to the onslaught of the West, but an ―active struggle of the Chinese to
meet the foreign and domestic challenges in an effort to regenerate
and transform their country from an outdated Confucian universal
empire to a modern national state, with a rightful place in the family
of nations.‖5 This author fully agrees with this observation. From a
legal perspective, the formation and development of the Chinese
attitude toward international law is, therefore, a reflection of this
historical transformation.6
I.

FORMAL INTRODUCTION OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO
CHINA

Beginning with the Opium War, Western imperialistic invasions
broke down China‘s Sino-centric world view and replaced it with an
4. Id. at 1–5. For a long time in history, geographical barriers kept the whole region of
East Asia separate from the West. To Westerners, East Asia was a remote and seemingly
inaccessible land at the end of the earth. Even today, in the European parlance, ―the Far
East‖ still remains in common use. However, the Chinese did not perceive their world the
same way the Westerners did. The Far Eastern region in Chinese eyes became Tianxia,
literally, ―all under Heaven,‖ of which China perceived itself to be the very center. Thus,
China's name, Zhongguo, denoted a sense of ―the central country‖ or Middle Kingdom
which embraced the whole world known to it. Such traditional Chinese perception of its
place in the world is what Western historians have meant by the term, ―Sinocentrism,‖ which
is used to characterize traditional China's relations with other nations generally. Of course,
China‘s self-image as the center of the world is a false idea in modern geographical terms.
Throughout history, however, such idea accorded closely with the facts of East Asian
experience, and had seemed to be reinforced by practical reality. Id. at 1–5.
5. IMMANUEL C.Y. HSÜ, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 14 (1975) [hereinafter HSÜ, RISE].
6. Since time immemorial, the conduct of China's ―foreign affairs‖ had been directed
under the so-called Sino-centralism based on Chinese cultural supremacy and an idea of allembracing unity. See Fairbank, supra note 3, at 2. This traditional world outlook was further
legitimized by Confucianist political philosophy that advocated peace and harmony in a
hierarchical and anti-egalitarian social order. See id. at 1. Until the arrival of expansionist
Western imperialistic powers on the Chinese scene in the middle of the 19th century, China's
foreign relations had been managed under an indigenous system known as the ―tributary
system,‖ whereby China, occupying the patriarchal position, assumed the leadership and, in
return, tributary states came into contact with China as part of the Chinese family of nations,
but in a subordinate position. Id. at 2–5.
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unequal treaty regime.7 In the process of destroying the traditional
Chinese world order and its institutions, the Western powers not only
used strong warships and efficient guns to ―put down China‘s
resistance by force,‖ but also endeavored to enlighten the Chinese
with Western ideas and institutions.8 A significant aspect of this latter
attempt was the formal introduction of the European system of
international law into China.9
After the signing of the Conventions of Peking in 1860, the
imperial court of the Qing Dynasty accepted the bitter reality that
China had no alternative but to learn to live with the West.10 As SinoWestern relations entered a new phase of a decade-long era of peace
and cooperation, Chinese officials who took charge of foreign affairs
became aware of the necessity of having some knowledge of
international law to deal with the West on a regular basis.11 In 1863, a
leading official of the Office of Foreign Affairs (Zong-li ya-men)
asked the American Minister, Anson Burlingame, to recommend an
authoritative work on international law that Western nations
recognized.12 The Chinese need for international law was further
evidenced by Prince Gong‘s memorial to the court in August 1864,
asking for imperial sanction of an appropriation of the printing of the
translated Henry Wheaton‘s Elements of International law,13 which
reads in part:
Your ministers have found that the Chinese spoken and
written language is learned with care by foreigners without
exception. Among them, the cleverest go even further and
immerse themselves in studying Chinese books. When a
case is argued or discussed, they can usually base
themselves on Chinese legal codes . . . . Unfortunately, the
regulations of foreign countries are all written in foreign
languages and we suffer from being unable to read them.
And it will still take some time for the students in the Tung7. See Chen Tiqiang, The People’s Republic of China and Public International Law, 8
DALHOUSIE L.J. 3, 6 (1984).
8. Id.
9. See id. at 4.
10. See HSÜ, RISE, supra note 5, at 214–19.
11. IMMANUEL C.Y. HSÜ, CHINA‘S ENTRANCE INTO THE FAMILY OF NATIONS 125 (1960)
[hereinafter HSÜ, ENTRANCE].
12. Id. at 127.
13. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (1863). In 1861, Prince
Gong (Yi Xin) was made the chief of the newly founded Tsungli Yamen, commonly known
to the Western powers as China's Office of Foreign Affairs. HSÜ, ENTRANCE, supra note 11,
at 108, 125.
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wen Kuan (School of Foreign Languages) to master the
foreign languages thoroughly . . . We have learned that
there is such a book as called Wan-kuoLü-li, ―Laws and
precedents of all nations.‖ Yet when we wanted to seek it
directly, and entrust its translation to the foreigners, we
were afraid that they might wish to keep it confidential and
not have it shown to us.14
The Qing court was not alone in realizing the importance of
learning Western international law. Having seen numerous Chinese
fumbles in diplomatic transactions, foreigners were also conscious of
the need of introducing their international law into China so that the
Chinese officials could comprehend the rules by which a semicolonial state was supposed to abide.15 It was William A. P. Martin,
an American missionary and sinologist, who assumed this task.
Even when he served as an interpreter to American Minister
William B. Reed in 1858, Martin came up with the idea of translating
a work on international law into Chinese.16 He originally intended to
translate Vattel‘s Le droit des gens when Ward, the American
minister to China, recommended Wheaton‘s Elements of
International Law as being more modern and equally authoritative.17
Wheaton served the United States as a career diplomat in Europe
for almost two decades. His Elements of International Law, published
in 1836, was the first systematic and large-scale treatise on
international law by an Anglo-American author. Based on the
author‘s rich diplomatic experiences and extensive scholarly studies,
the book focused on diplomatic transactions, cases, and other
historical precedents. Wheaton‘s reasoning impressed readers with its
straightforward style and impartiality and was frequently cited in
American court decisions and state papers. No less than 15 American
and English editions have been published.18 This wide readership
reflected the high esteem that the American conception of
international law held at the time.

14. 3 QINGDAI CHOUBAN YIWU SHIMO [HISTORY OF THE MANAGEMENT OF BARBARIAN
AFFAIRS OF THE QING DYNASTY], 1184–85 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju Press) [hereinafter
MANAGEMENT OF BARBARIAN AFFAIRS]. For an English translation, see SSU-YÜTENG & JOHN
K. FAIRBANK, CHINA‘S RESPONSE TO THE WEST, A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY 1839-1923, at 97–
99 (1965).
15. HSÜ, ENTRANCE, supra note 11, at 126.
16. Id. See also W.A.P. MARTIN, A CYCLE OF CATHAY 222 (1897).
17. MANAGEMENT OF BARBARIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 14.
18. Id. at 234–35.
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In Martin‘s opinion, Wheaton‘s book was a full and impartial
digest, and as such it found its way into all the cabinets of Europe.19
Martin felt that the Chinese would benefit from a translation of this
work.20
When Martin began his translation in 1862, he was encouraged
by Robert Hart, then inspector-general of Chinese Customs, and he
was able to secure the help he needed from Chinese scholars for the
translation. Originally, Martin wanted to show the Chinese the
Western concepts and principles by which international relations
were conducted. He did not expect any sponsorship from the Qing
court. In the spring of 1863, he wrote to the American Minister,
Anson Burlingame, proposing to complete the translation so it could
be used by the Chinese government. Burlingame gave Martin
encouragement and assured Martin that he would assist him in
bringing the translation before the officials of the Qing court. In June
of that year, Martin set out for the north and brought the translated
passage with him. At Tianjin, he was met by the Qing court ministersuperintendent of trade. Looking over Wheaton‘s manuscript, the
minister-superintendent was impressed with its acknowledgement of
the needs of China in handling its new relationships, and promised to
write on the subject to the court.21
Through Burlingame‘s efforts, Martin obtained an interview
with four top officials of the Court‘s Office of Foreign Affairs on
September 11, 1863.22 The Office welcomed the manuscript right
away. ―This will be our guide when we send envoys to foreign
countries,‖ one of them said.23 Martin assured the officials that ―this
book would be appropriate reading for all countries having treaty
relations. But because its text [the Chinese version] and meaning do
not go very intelligible and satisfactory, he requested our [Chinese]
corrections and revision for the purpose of publication.‖24
Prince Gong had already learned about the translation from
Burlingame and was secretly anxious to read it. Upon studying it, he
found it useful but hard to comprehend, as he later reported to the
court:

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

HSÜ, ENTRANCE, supra note 11, at 127.
Id.
MARTIN, supra note 16, at 222, 233–34.
HSÜ, ENTRANCE, supra note 11, at 127–28.
MARTIN, supra note 16, at 233.
MANAGEMENT OF BARBARIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 14, at 1185.
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Examining this book, I found it generally deals with
alliances, laws of war, and other things. Particularly it has
laws on the outbreak of war and the check and balance
between states. Its words and sentences are confused and
disorderly; we cannot clearly understand it unless it is
explained in person.25
Eventually, four secretaries of the Court‘s Office of Foreign
Affairs were appointed by the prince to help edit the text. After
nearly six months of editing, the Chinese translation of Martin‘s
manuscript was finally completed in the winter of 1864. The book is
prefaced by a two-page essay describing the various nations in the
world, followed by two simple maps of the Eastern and Western
hemispheres that do not appear in the original Wheaton.26 It also
contains two Chinese forewords.27
Although the edited Chinese text is in good, semi-classical style,
which posed no problem for the Chinese literati,28 the accuracy of
Martin‘s translation still leaves much to be desired by today‘s
standards. In fact, Martin‘s work is not a translations in the strictest
sense, but rather a paraphrased interpretation of Wheaton, which
strongly reflects the translator‘s own perspective of international
law.29 Many Chinese terms were presented by the translator in an
imprecise, though understandable manner, and are outdated today.30
Moreover, at times Martin‘s renditions were so free that they actually
constituted explanations rather than translations; for instance,
―Congress of Verona‖ was rendered as ―Four countries controlling
Spain.‖31 Hsü also compares an excerpt of Martin‘s work with the
original passage from Wheaton, in which the lack of universality of
international law is discussed. Wheaton, after quoting the views of
Grotius, Bynkershoeck, Leibnitz, and Montesquieu, says:
There is then, according to these writers, no universal
law of nations, such as Cicero describes in his treatise De
Republica, binding upon the whole human race—which all
mankind in all ages and countries, ancient and modern,
25. HSÜ, ENTRANCE, supra note 11, at 128.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 134.
28. Id. at 129.
29. Id.
30. Id. Hsü in his book gives a short list as an example to show discrepancies between
the terms used by Martin and those used at the present time. Id. at 130.
31. Id.
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savage and civilized, Christian and Pagan, have recognized
in theory or in practice, have professed to obey, or have in
fact obeyed.‖32
Martin‘s rendition of this paragraph, when literally re-translated
into English, reads as follows:
Judging from them there is no universally practiced
law as is said in Te-li [De Republica], for there has never
been a case that is accepted by all nations at all times,
barbarian or civilized, within or without the Church.33
Such imprecise translations, according to Hsü, ran through the
book.
Nonetheless, Martin‘s work is still praiseworthy, if one considers
the fact that the general meaning of the original Wheaton is not lost.
The book is titled Wanguo Gongfa (萬國公法) in Chinese, meaning
Public Law of All Nations, because Martin held that international law
―is commonly used in various nations and is not a monopoly of any
single state. Moreover, it is like the laws and regulations of the
various states, hence it is also called Wanguo Lü-li (萬國律例),‖
meaning laws and regulations of all nations.34 Today, however, the
term ―international law‖ is translated as Guoji Fa (国际法), or the
law between states, a term created by Dr. Mitsukuri Rinsho of Japan
in 1873 after Martin‘s translation was introduced there in 1865.35
II. REACTIONS TO THE FORMAL INTRODUCTION
LAW INTO CHINA

OF INTERNATIONAL

While Martin‘s manuscript was in the process of being edited at
the Office of Foreign Affairs in 1864, a diplomatic incident occurred
that gave Chinese officials an opportunity to test the usefulness of
Western international law.36 In that year, Otto von Bismarck‘s
Prussia fought Denmark in the Second Schleswig War. In March, the
Prussian minister to China, Guido von Rehfues, known to the
Chinese as Li Fusi, arrived in China on a warship. Finding three
Danish merchant ships off Dagu Kou (a sea port near Tianjin), von
Rehfues seized them as a war prize. After that, he sent a letter to the
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

WHEATON, supra note 13, at 17.
W.A.P. MARTIN, WANGGUO GONGFA [Public Law of All Nations] 61.
HSÜ, supra note 11, at 129.
Id.
Id. at 132.
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superintendent of trade at Tianjin, giving notice of his arrival and
asking for a date to be received by the Office of Foreign Affairs.
Upon the report of both the request and the seizure, the Office
immediately protested the Prussian minister‘s action. The protest was
motivated by the fear that if China remained indifferent towards the
seizure, it would constitute China‘s acquiescence to the claim that the
area of water in question was the high seas, which, according to
Western international law, belongs to no country.37 Prince Gong
explained this to the court:
Foreign countries have the view, that oceans and seas over
10 li [one marine league] from the coast, where it is beyond
the reach of guns and cannon, are common area of all
countries. [The ships of] any country may come and go or
stay in that area at will.38
The Office of Foreign Affairs insisted that the seizure of the
Danish ships took place in China‘s ―inner ocean,‖ a Chinese
equivalent to the Western term of ―territorial sea‖ and constituted an
extension of a European war to an area under China‘s exclusive
jurisdiction. Prussian minister von Rehfues argued that the European
law of war allowed the seizure because it was far enough from the
Chinese coast. To this, Prince Gong replied that the place was not the
high seas but China‘s territorial waters:
The various [inner] oceans under China‘s jurisdiction
have, as a rule, been specifically stipulated in all her peace
treaties with the foreign nations, and in the peace treaty
with your nation, there is such a term as ‗Chinese ocean.‘
You know this more clearly than any other country and
how can you say it is beyond your comprehension? As to
the European law of war, China cannot be obliged to know
all.39
Prince Gong further argued that the detention of ships that
belonged to one foreign country in China‘s territorial waters by
another foreign country engaged in hostilities with the former was an
act of ―despising China‖ and that the Chinese protest was ―not for
Denmark but for preserving China‘s rights.‖40 Prince Gong
37. Id. at 133.
38. MANAGEMENT OF BARBARIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 14, at 1144.
39. HSÜ, supra note 11, at 133. Martin translated ‗maritime territory‘ as ―ocean area
within the jurisdiction of a nation,‖ a less concise definition than ―inner ocean.‖ Id.
40. Id.
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reinforced his protest by notifying the Prussian minister that these
actions were unacceptable to China and, unless the three Danish ships
were released, no reception of the Prussian minister would be
possible. Von Rehfues saw the seriousness of the situation, released
the Danish ships and paid a compensation of $1,500 for the third. The
incident ended peacefully.
The Chinese officials that handled this dispute did not expressly
quote Wheaton‘s book with respect to jurisdiction over territorial
waters. But it is beyond doubt that Martin‘s translation of Wheaton‘s
Elements of International Law influenced their combined use of the
principle of territorial waters, China‘s treaty relations with the West,
and the refusal to recognize von Rehfues‘ ministerial status.41 This
diplomatic victory thus proved the usefulness of Martin‘s manuscript.
By this time, Prince Gong was ready to submit to the court a
memorial, asking for its sanction of an appropriation for the printing
and distribution of Martin‘s translation. In the memorial, Prince Gong
stated:
Your ministers find that [the contents of this] book on
foreign laws and regulations is not basically in complete
agreement with the Chinese systems, it nevertheless
contains sporadic useful points. For instance, in connection
with Prussia‘s detention of the Danish ships in Tientsin
harbor this year, your ministers covertly used statements
from that law book in arguing with [Von Rehfues].
Thereby, the Prussian minister acknowledge his mistake
and bowed his head without further contention. This seems
[conclusive of its usefulness].42
The imperial sanction was duly granted: five hundred taels (a
varying unit of weight used in East Asia, usually one tael is around
38 grams, or 1.75 ounces) were appropriated for publication and three
hundred copies were distributed to the provinces for the use of local
officials.
The immediate Chinese response to Wheaton‘s work was far
from encouraging. Although they were satisfied with the work done
by Martin and Burlingame, the officials in the Office of Foreign
Affairs were worried about the true intentions of these foreigners.
They were also skeptical of the value of the book as a whole. They
feared that this product of seemingly useful Western legal learning
41. See id. at 133–34.
42. Id. at 134.
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might be a Trojan Horse.43 The Chinese mistrust accounts for why, in
handling the case of the seizure of the Danish ships, they did not
expressly quote Wheaton as authority to support their arguments.44
Such mentality was evident if one looks into Prince Gong‘s same
memorial:
[Martin said] that it (this book) should be read by all
countries having treaty relations with others. In case of
dispute it can be taken for reference and can be quoted . . . .
Your ministers forestalled his attempt to get us to follow
this book, by telling him at once that China has her own
laws and institutions and that it is inconvenient to consult
foreign books. Martin, however, points out that although
the Ta-Ching Lü-Li has now been translated by foreign
countries, China has never compelled foreign countries to
act by it. It cannot be that when a foreign book is translated
into Chinese, China should be forced to follow it. Thus he
has pleaded repeatedly . . . .
Your ministers think that his purpose is two-fold,
firstly, to boast that foreign countries also have laws, and
secondly, to imitate men like Matteo Ricci in making a
name in China.45
Thus, it is apparent that their deep-rooted suspicions of the West,
coupled with their diehard image of the traditional Chinese universal
overlordship,46 made it difficult for the Chinese officials to accept
international law as a body of legal principles and rules for regulating
relations between states on the basis of sovereign equality and
independence. Chinese officials‘ need for the introduction of Western
international law did not stem from their belief in the value of the
legal system per se; instead, they viewed their study of Western law
43. T.F. Tsiang, Bismarck and the Introduction of International Law into China, 15
CHINESE SOC. & POL. SCI. REV. 98, 100 (1931).
44. Id. Tsiang maintains that with or without the translation of Wheaton, the Yamen
officials would have protested against extending the sphere of Prussian-Danish military
activities to Chinese waters, but with Wheaton before them, they found their own wishes
supported not only by Chinese practice but also by a body of laws which Western nations
called ―international.‖ With this additional support, they pressed their case all the more
strongly. Id. at 101.
45. MANAGEMENT OF BARBARIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 14.
46. See Li Zhaojie (James Li), Traditional Chinese World Outlook, 1 CHINESE J. INT‘L L.
20, 53 (2002). This is an expression used to characterize the traditional Chinese perception
of the world, which assumed that China remained the center of civilization and that the
Chinese form of civilization was superior. Id. Noticeably, such superiority was not one of
more material power but of culture. Id. at 25.
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as a study of the enemy. As Hsü observes, knowing ―one‘s enemy
was the first step toward winning the battle.‖47
Along the line of playing off the Western barbarians against one
another Prince Gong entered his measured conclusion in his masterly
memorial: ―This book (Martin‘s translation) contains quite a few
ways of controlling and bridling the consuls which may be useful . . .
.‖48
Indeed, Western international law was ―not basically in complete
agreement with the Chinese system.‖49 Acceptance of this exotic
legal learning of Western barbarians would amount to the
abandonment of the long-honored traditional Chinese systems and
institutions. Amid the strong xenophobic atmosphere of the era, even
a very narrow-minded pragmatic attitude toward the usefulness of
international law had to be couched in precautionary terms to avoid
possible attacks from the die-hard conservatives of the court.
However, the publication of the translated Wheaton‘s Elements
of International Law marked the beginning of the systematic and
formal introduction of Western international law into China. It was
an epoch-making event in that it ―enabled the Chinese to have a first
glimpse of what was called international law in the West.‖50 It
signified China‘s open recognition of the existence of strong and
independent nations beyond China. Given the time-honored and
persistent Chinese claim to universal overlordship, this recognition
amounted to a significant departure from their traditional perception
of the world. Regardless of his motivation, Martin‘s contribution to
this great event has had a lasting effect. As a reward for Martin‘s
pace-setting undertakings, the Qing court appointed him president
and professor of international law at China‘s first foreign language
school, Tongwen Guan (serving from 1869 until 1894) and the first
chancellor of the Imperial University of Peking (serving from 1898
until 1900), the predecessor of today‘s Peking University.51 Martin
also received many other high honors from the Chinese.
As for foreigners, the formal introduction of Western
international law into China met with a mixed response. Believing
that international law was the best fruit of Western civilization,
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

HSÜ, ENTRANCE, supra note 11, at 135.
MANAGEMENT OF BARBARIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 14, at 1185.
Id.
Chen, supra note 7, at 6.
HSÜ, ENTRANCE, supra note 11, at 136
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Martin saw his translation of Wheaton as a vehicle for bringing the
heathen Chinese government closer to Christianity. Thus, upon
learning of the Chinese success in applying their knowledge of
international law to the case of the seizure of the Danish ships, he
heartily congratulated the Chinese on their ability to digest new
concepts and ideas which had been hardly known to them in the past
two thousand years.52 Martin even thought that his work might ―stand
second in influence to the translation of the Bible!‖53
In keeping with Martin‘s optimistic tone, Burlingame signaled
his approval by telling the U.S. State Department about Martin‘s
remarkable success ―in getting the Chinese government to adopt and
publish Wheaton‘s international law.‖54 Secretary of State William
Seward praised Burlingame for what he had done, and was thrilled
that China was inclined to respect the obligations of international
law.55 He said that ―the learning and zeal of the Chinese Government
in connection with this matter cannot be too highly commended.‖56
The British minister in Beijing, Frederick Bruce, lent his support and
encouragement to Martin from the beginning, saying that ―the work
would do good by showing the Chinese that the nations of the West
have principles by which they are guided, and that force is not their
only law.‖57 A Russian minister told Burlingame that his government
wished to see China become closer with the family of nations and
subject to the obligations of international law.58
While these Western diplomats viewed Martin‘s work positively,
others strongly condemned the formal introduction of Western
international law into China. They were horrified that China might be
in possession of some elementary knowledge of international law.59
Indeed, Martin reported that M. Klecskowsky, chargé d’affairs at the
French legation, shouted to Burlingame: ―Who is this man who is
going to give the Chinese an insight into our European international
law? Kill him—choke him off; he will make us endless trouble.‖60
The unofficial Western trading community in China was also
52. Id.
53. Mary Boggs, William Alexander Parsons Martin, Missionary to China, 1850–1916
(1949) (unpublished M.A. thesis, McCormick Theological Seminary)
54. HSÜ, ENTRANCE, supra note 11, at 136.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 137.
58. Id.
59. Chen, supra note 7, at 7.
60. HSÜ, ENTRANCE, supra note 11 at 138.
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ambivalent towards the work. As the self-appointed vanguard and
promoters of Western civilization in the East, they assumed a
patronizing attitude towards the Chinese acceptance of their
international law. On the other hand, as beneficiaries of the unequal
treaty regime, they were apprehensive that supplying the Chinese a
legal instrument might be used to roll back the newly acquired
political and commercial privileges and to prevent the exaction of
further concessions.61 A North China Herald article characteristically
reflects this ambivalent sentiment:
Whether we are supplying weapons, which may at some
future period be directed against ourselves, or which will
only be turned to the acquisition of new conquests, cannot
at present be decided. To stem the stream while it is still
near its source, and guide it into proper channels should
now be our aim.62
Indeed, as indicated by this short passage, foreign residents in
China began to regret that the Chinese had discovered ―those flowery
means of diplomacy where they so highly excelled‖ and admitted that
―we must make up our minds to see the Chinese in future contesting
acts to which they are opposed on grounds which we ourselves
recognize.‖63
III. FAILURE TO APPLY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DEFENSE OF CHINA‘S
INTERESTS
In 1867, Martin returned to the United States for two years to
study international law and political economy at the University of
Indiana, where he earned a doctorate.64 After he returned to China in
1869, the Qing court designated him president of the T’ung-wen
kuan.65 Martin added a variety of subjects to the eight-year
curriculum, including international law.66 In 1879, the school
61. Id. See also Jerome Alan Cohen, Chinese Attitude Toward International Law—and
Our Own, in CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW: RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 285
(Jerome A. Cohen ed., 1970).
62. NORTH CHINA HERALD, May 21, 1864, at 82.
63. MARK MANCALL, CHINA AT THE CENTER: 300 YEARS OF FOREIGN POLICY 188 (1984).
64. HSÜ, supra note 5, at 336.
65. Id.
66. Id. The first three of the new subjects were devoted to linguistic preparation, while
the next five covered scientific and general studies. In 1879, 163 students were enrolled in
the program. ―The quality of students, however, was rather low, since few good Manchu or
Chinese families would send their sons, with the result that a considerable portion of the
student body consisted of middle aged mediocrities enrolled for a pension.‖ Id.
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enrolled nine students in the program of international law,67 and in
time it produced a number of distinguished diplomats.68 China also
began to send students to Europe and America to study a variety of
topics including international law. Ma Jianzhong, for example,
pursued a doctoral degree in international law in France from 1876 to
1879. After returning to China, he provided valuable service in
international affairs to Viceroy Li Hung-chang.69 His expertise in
international law apparently helped the Office of Foreign Affairs
avoid many possible diplomatic blunders.
Sino-Western relations during the second half of the nineteenth
century forced Chinese officials to abandon their traditional attitude
towards foreign relations and to learn to conduct foreign affairs on
the basis of international law. In 1864, Ding Jichang, the Shanghai
Daotai, skillfully and firmly rejected several extra-legal commercial
requests from foreigners by declaring that China had no treaty-based
legal obligations to honor such requests.
In 1873, Viceroy Li Hongzhang cited Wheaton‘s words of how
newly arrived diplomats present their credentials to persuade
Emperor Tongzhi to receive foreign diplomats. Li‘s advice soothed
the emperor‘s fear that he might personally have to negotiate with the
foreigners and that open dispute might occur at the court. Wheaton‘s
teachings also guided the Chinese through the conclusion of a
commercial treaty with Peru in 1874. During the negotiation the
Chinese officials insisted on reciprocal most-favored-nation
treatment, as recommended by Wheaton.
Beginning in 1876, China sent its permanent diplomatic
representatives abroad. While treaties formed the basis of many of
these legations, those in Washington and St. Petersburg were
noticeably not. The American and Russian Treaties of Tianjin merely
stipulated the right of the United States and Russia to establish
legations in China, without giving China the right to reciprocate.
Thus, the Chinese legation in the United States and Russia rested on
the general principles of international law, not on treaties.70

67. Id. at 336–37.
68. Yen-P‘ing Hao & Erh-Min Wang, Changing Chinese Views of Western Relations,
1840-95, in 11 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA 162 (John K. Fairbank & Kwang-Ching
Liu eds., 1980).
69. Id. at 197.
70. HSÜ, supra note 11, at 186.
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By the 1880s, China had established diplomatic legations in the
most of the leading Western nations.71 China was also invited to
attend the sixth meeting of the Association for the Reform and
Codification of the Law of Nations in 1878.72
This association, founded in Brussels in 1873, expressed a strong
interest in extending international law to the Far East in 1876 and
1877 and invited China and Japan to participate in its future
meetings. Guo Songtao, China‘s first minister to England,
represented China and praised the association for its efforts to
improve the law of nations ―for the benefit of all governments and
peoples.‖73 He said he was ―very desirous of attaining a knowledge of
the science, in the hope that it will be beneficial to my country‖ even
though China did not fully recognize the rules of international law.
The Association elected Guo as honorary vice-president in
recognition of China‘s inclusion. The Association later elected Guo‘s
successor in London, Zeng Jize, a famous Chinese diplomat of the
time, to the same post.74
Despite disagreements and divergent views on international law
among Western writers, China often referred to Western international
law in conducting its foreign affairs and indicated its willingness to
learn more about the new field.75 By the time the Qing dynasty was
overthrown in 1911, China had become a participant in the Western
state system and was conversant with its institutions, processes, and
norms.76 China also attended the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899
and 1907 and joined the Universal Postal Union. Hence, this period
of modern Chinese history saw the growth of the need for more
knowledge of international law.77

71. Id. They are England, France, Germany, Japan, Peru, Russia, Spain, and the United
States. Id.
72. HSÜ, supra note 11, at 206.
73. Id. at 206–07.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 128.
76. HSÜ, RISE supra note 5, at 468–70. See generally Weiching W. Yen, How China
Administrates Her Foreign Affairs, 3 AM. J. INT‘L L. 537 (1909).
77. Beginning from 1876, Martin translated several other works of international law with
assistance of his students at the Tongwen Guan. HSÜ, supra note 11, at 138. These works
include: THEODORE WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1877);
L‘INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW], LE MANUEL DES
LOIS DE LA GUERRE [THE MANUAL REGARDING THE LAW OF WAR] (1897); and WILLIAM
EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (1903). Id. He helped students translate
the following: GEORGE FRIEDRICH DE MARTEN, LE GUIDE DIPLOMATIQUE [GUIDE TO
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It is beyond doubt that, through these translations, Chinese
officials improved their knowledge of international law. Moreover,
their limited diplomatic experience also tended to vindicate
usefulness of international law as an instrument for defending
China‘s interests.78
Many Chinese officials were even entranced by the idea of the
omnipotence of international law. Guo Songtao, for example, was a
great enthusiast of international law, believing that China must rely
on international law and the treaty system while dealing with other
nations.79 He made favorable comments on international law in his
Chronicles of a Mission to the West: ―[The Western powers] created
the law of nations; they emulate with each other in faithfulness and
righteousness, and lay particular emphasis on friendship among
nations; they are reasonable and courteous; they add decorum to
substance; they are far better than the states during the Spring and
Autumn period.‖80
Cheng Kuan-ying, a compradore-reformer of the time, had such
high regard for international law that he discussed the topic in the
very first essay of his book on reform, I-yen. He examined the
principles and usefulness of international law in greater detail in later
editions.81
Another exemplary advocate of international law was Viceroy Li
Hongzhang, who, for a long time, was in charge of China‘s foreign
affairs. In his foreword to the translated Hall‘s Treatise on
International Law, he stated: ―Public [international] law is the law of
all the nations in the world. When the law is abided by, the world is
in order; when the law is violated, the world is in chaos.‖ In his
opinion, Hall‘s treatise ―presents the law clearly and fairly, and
should be looked up to as the standard by [Chinese] negotiators in the
future.‖
In order to enforce international law, Chen Qiu, another public
figure in the reform-minded literati, proposed in 1893 that the
world‘s nations establish a world organization. He predicted that his

DIPLOMACY] (1876); JOHANN KASPAR BLUNTSCHLI, DAS MODERNE VÖLKERRECHT [MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW] (1880). Id.
78. See JEROME ALAN COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE‘S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY 8 (1974).
79. HSÜ, supra note 11, at 181.
80. Chen, supra note 7, at 7.
81. Yen-P‘ing Hao & Erh-Min Wang, supra note 68, at 197.

Li macro

144

5/22/2012 10:13 AM

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[VOL.27:128

proposal would materialize in thirty years. In 1898, Pi Yung-nien and
T‘ang Ts‘ai-ch‘ang established a small society known as the
Association of International Law Studies.82
Kang Youwei, the leader of the 1898 radical reform movement
(One-Hundred-Day Reform), also felt that China‘s foreign relations
should be established on the international law principles of sovereign
equality and independence. According to him, ―[i]n the whole earth,
China is only one of fifty-six countries,‖ and ―[t]oday [the states of
the world] compete with each other rather like [the separate Chinese
states] at the period of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States
(722–221 BCE), and there is no longer a unified rule as under the
Han, Tang, Sung and Ming dynasties.‖83 Therefore, Kang believed
that different nations on the earth should possess equal rights in
dealing with each other. On that basis, he advocated that the Qing
court should reject the traditional Sino-centric world view and should
follow international law in dealing with other countries.84
Yet this candle of the Western legal learning did not light much
of the darkness. Despite the improvement of their knowledge of
international law, Chinese officials failed to make active use of this
exotic legal learning in throwing off the yoke of the unequal treaty
regime. As illustrated by Hsü, reasons for such failure were
multidimensional.85
First and foremost, effective application of international law for
recovering China‘s lost interests and rights would require abandoning
the traditional Chinese ways of thinking and the time-honored
Chinese tizhi (basic structure of the state and society).86
Unfortunately, the Chinese officials were by no means ready to do
that. The die-hard conservatives at the court, who powerfully
manipulated public opinion, vehemently attacked the introduction of
international law into China. ―They asserted that they had heard of
transforming the barbarians by the Chinese way of life, but never of
changing the Chinese with the barbarians‘ ways,‖ wrote Hsü.87 As
self-claimed defenders of the Chinese heritage and jealous guardians
82. Id. & n.133.
83. WOLFGANG FRANKE, CHINA AND THE WEST: THE CULTURAL ENCOUNTER, 13TH TO
20TH CENTURIES 109 (R.A. Wilson trans., 1967).
84. Id.
85. HSÜ, supra note 11, at 200–06. In China, ―public opinion‖ was considered the
prevailing opinion of educated intellectuals. Id at 200.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 201.
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of the principles of the Chinese li, they denounced the acceptance of
international law as an un-Chinese activity, traitorous to the national
tradition and un-filial to the ancestors.
Thus, those who showed interest in this body of the Western
learning would risk being condemned as advocates of Westernization
and envoys to the West. They were seen by opponents of
international law as ―ingratiating themselves with foreigners,‖
―serving the barbarians,‖ ―having clandestine relations with the
enemy,‖ or ―sinners against Confucian heritage.‖88 Such a strong
anti-foreign attitude does not appear to have stemmed ―from a
realization of the dangers of [Western] imperialism, but from a
feeling of insecurity about their privileged position.‖89
Self-motivated anti-foreignism arguments successfully created
the impression that foreign affairs were a dangerous business and to
associate with it was to betray one‘s decency. Thus, in his preface to
Martin‘s translation of Wheaton, Zhang Sigui, a member of the
Office of Foreign Affairs, had to compare the leading Western
nations to the contending states of the Warring States Period in
ancient China, which were considered heresy in some quarters.90
Moreover, even though the more progressive mandarins realized that
the Western challenge was inescapable and that China must learn
from the ―barbarians‖ if it was to survive, they saw the value of
Western international law only within the context of maintaining and
strengthening the traditional Chinese way of life and institutions.91
Accordingly, international law was regarded no more useful than
restraining ―wild‖ foreign consuls and avoiding diplomatic faux
pas.92 Such limited application of international law could by no
means forestall further aggression of foreign imperialism, let alone
recover China‘s lost rights and interests.
In addition to the lack of political will, the failure to apply
international law for the defense of China‘s rights and interests was

88. Id. at 201–02.
89. Id. at 202.
90. See id. at 208. During the period of Spring and Autumn (772–476 BCE), of
thousands of vassal states created by the founder of the Zhou dynasty (founded in 770 BCE),
only 160 were left; among those 160 vassal states, only 12 were the most important. They
absorbed each other through wars until 221 BCE when Qin, the most powerful state, unified
all other warring states through military conquest. Thus, in Chinese history, the Warring
States Period refers to that from 476 to 221 BCE.
91. See HSÜ, supra note 11, at 138–45.
92. Id. at 145.
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attributable also to the unfavorable cultural milieu.93 The traditional
Chinese perception of the world order never developed the concept of
state sovereignty in its modern sense. Law was primarily considered
as personal rather than territorial. Such ideas as territorial jurisdiction
or national rights were thus characteristically lacking in the Chinese
management of foreign relations. Within this historical context, the
Chinese accepted doctrines, rules, and practices of Western
international law as their temporary and expedient response to the
challenge posed by expanding foreign imperialist powers. As Hsü
points out, the Chinese granted foreign powers privileges, such as
extraterritoriality, one-sided most-favored-nation treatment, fixed
tariffs, free navigation of China‘s internal waters, and leased
territories at many port cities in China without any sense of serious
loss of China‘s state sovereignty and national rights.94
Of course, no one was ready and willing to make these
concessions that would be otherwise condemned as gross violations
of the principle of state sovereignty in the twentieth century. In fact,
the Manchu rulers bitterly resented being forced to grant foreign
powers these concessions at gun point, for it hurt the Chinese pride.
Yet, the Chinese officials did not regret the loss of these rights as
much as they regretted the way in which they were lost. As a result,
their desire for revenge was far stronger than their will to recover the
loss of rights. Confining themselves to this historical tradition,
Chinese officials merely realized the usefulness of international law
for restraining the ―wild‖ foreign consuls, but they never attempted to
go further to challenge the basic raison d’être of their ―wildness.‖95
Years later, even when the evils of these concessions became all
too obvious, the Chinese officials still failed to take active measures
to remove them.96 The historical experience taught the Chinese that
external troubles were caused mainly by internal weakness. 97 Thus,
―[i]f China was strong, barbarian problems would be solved before
they arose.‖98 Under such historical guidance, the more urgent and
basic solution to the barbarian problem was to put China‘s own house
in order under the Self-Strengthening Movement rather than to make
piecemeal efforts to apply Western international law to recover
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 139.
See id. at 138–41.
Id. at 141–42.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 144.
Id.
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China‘s lost rights and to rescind the unequal treaty regime.99 ―[A]t a
time when foreign assistance and cooperation were needed for selfstrengthening and the suppression of domestic rebellions, a
movement to cut foreigners‘ privileges would be impolitic.‖100
The Alcock Convention of 1869, the first ―equal‖ treaty that
China negotiated with a Western power, best illustrates this attitude.
The convention officially revised the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin with
England. China could have taken this opportunity to apply its
knowledge of international law in an attempt to remove
extraterritoriality, the most-favored-nation clause, and the tariff
restrictions from the treaty, but made no such attempt. They merely
tried to improve the conditions within the framework of the treaty. As
a result, the revised treaty only made moderate changes to the mostfavored-nation clause and tariff restriction.101
But the Office of Foreign Affairs already felt gratified with their
―accomplishments.‖102 Of course, what they had accomplished turned
out to be nothing but paltry amelioration within the vast yoke of the
unequal treaty regime. No attempt was ever made to throw off the
yoke itself. Little wonder that the British minister Rutherford Alcock
saw it as ―a matter of congratulations‖ that the Chinese did not ―insist
upon‖ the abolition of consular extraterritorial jurisdiction, which
was known to be their ―cardinal‖ desire.103 According to his
judgment, ―no country or Western government has ever before made
such liberal concessions to foreign trade.‖104
By the late nineteenth century, it became all too evident that the
Qing dynasty by and large had fallen into an irretrievable decline.105
Internal rebellion and external aggression and humiliation, coupled
with political mismanagement, had so weakened and degraded the

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 141. The most-favored-nation clause was only conditionally limited by Article
1 of the Convention, which allowed that, in order for British subjects to participate in the
advantages accorded by the Chinese to other powers, they must also accept the conditions
under which such accordance was made. The tariff restrictions were slightly relaxed to allow
China to increase the export duty on silk and the import duty on opium. Id. (citing 1
MARITIME CUSTOMS, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, ETC. BETWEEN CHINA AND FOREIGN STATES
478–83 (2d ed. 1917)).
102. Yen-P‘ing Hao & Erh-Min Wang, supra note 68, at 76–77. As the revised treaty did
not satisfy the British demands, British government later refused to ratify it. Id.
103. HSÜ, supra note 11, at 141.
104. Yen-P‘ing Hao & Erh-Min Wang, supra note 68, at 77.
105. HSÜ, supra note 11 at 144.
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dynasty that its imminent failing was just a matter of time. 106 In the
time of what the Chinese call ―the pre-ordained finale,‖ survival,
rather than improvement of its lot, became the most central and
urgent concern.107 With diplomatic failures coming one after another,
a sense of futility regarding China‘s position set in.108 Thus, their
eventual mastery of international law made the Chinese increasingly
aware of the limited value of this legal learning for a country which
lacked the military, political, and economic power to defend itself.109
Cui Guoying, a Chinese diplomat, said in his Diary of a Mission to
the United States, Japan and Peru: ―International law is just like
Chinese statutory law—reasonable but unreliable. If there is right
without might, the right will not prevail.‖110 Such a sentiment of
futility was also characteristically expressed by Zheng Guanying, a
reformer at that time:
Public [international] law draws its force from unreliable
principles. Whereas powerful [states] can enforce it to
restrain [the wrong-doers], weak [states] are bound to
forebear being wronged. Thus, only by working with a will
to make itself strong will a nation be benefited by it
[international law]; if a nation remains weak and dejected,
how can it be helped by international law?111
The pervasive feeling of helplessness made the Chinese fear that
any attempt to invoke international law to recover China‘s lost rights
would necessarily entail a treaty revision, which in turn would place
China in an even more disadvantageous position, for it might open
new opportunities for foreigners to exact more demands. Thus, the
Chinese had no desire, let alone concrete plans, to take advantage of
their knowledge of international law to assert China‘s sovereign
rights and to abrogate the unequal treaty regime. They directed their
energy and attention to ferret out the foreigners‘ next moves in order
to devise means of blocking them. They had a pious hope that China
could be left alone to work out its salvation in its own way. The best
they could do was to keep the status quo by persuading foreigners to
adhere to the existing treaty system and by citing international law to

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See id. See also HSÜ, RISE, supra note 5, at 468–70.
HSÜ, supra note 11, at 144.
See id. at 141.
See id.
COHEN & CHIU, supra note 78, at 10.
GUOJIFA [International Law] 18 (Wang Tieya ed., 1981).
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avoid diplomatic faux pas which otherwise might give foreigners the
pretext to exact new demands.112
Within this passive and defensive atmosphere, Chinese officials
regarded treaty revision as a one-way affair.113 It was an occasion
only for the foreigners to make new demands, not for the Chinese to
reduce the foreigners‘ rights. All China could do was to bargain with
the foreigners about the new concessions.114 Even reform-minded and
well-informed officials, such as Li Hongzhang, took the view that
once the treaty ratifications were exchanged, nothing more could be
done about it.115 Guo Songtao had the shallow belief that, in dealing
with foreign nations, China must rely on international law and the
treaty system imposed upon China by foreign powers.116 As he wrote
in 1866, ―[i]f Westerners abide by the treaties whereas we do not,
then the injustice rests with us.‖117 When the Chinese came to realize
that treaty revision could also be two-way affair and used in China‘s
favor, political considerations seem to have prevented them from
employing such dynamic maneuvers.118
In 1888, for instance, the United States enacted the Chinese
Exclusion Act, which violated the four Sino-American treaties
concluded between 1844 and 1880. As such, China could have
justifiably taken counter measures by refusing to honor those treaties.
The Chinese minister to Washington pointed out that the American
violation of an important treaty stipulation released China from the
duty to observe all its previous treaties with the United States. The
United States recognized that China was entitled to denounce these
treaties. However, the Chinese officials‘ fear of trouble was so
overwhelming that they did not even consider using the opportunity
to denounce those unequal treaties or at least revise them to China‘s
advantage by invoking the principle of rebus sic statibus.119
Viewed from a larger perspective, the reason for the Chinese
failure to apply international law in defense of China‘s interests may
lie in its failure to adequately cope with the Western impact and to
initiate modern reforms. Until the end of the nineteenth century, there
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

HSÜ, supra note 11, at 143–44.
Id. at 143.
Id.
Id. at 142.
Yen-P‘ing Hao & Erh-Min Wang, supra note 68, at 164.
Id.
COHEN & CHIU, supra note 78, at 10.
Id.
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was a conspicuous absence of internal efforts to turn the country into
a modern nation state.
There was only a strong and deep, if subdued, vindictive
desire to avenge the burning of the Summer Palace and the
hurried flight of the Emperor Xian Feng to Rehe in 1860.
One day, the mandarins rationalized, the self-strengthening
movement would enable China to efface these dynastic
humiliations and drive away the foreign devils, but until
that day the [unequal] treaties must be endured as facts of
life.120
Thus, in the days when might was stronger than right, and without the
dynamic motivating and supporting power of nationalism,
international law could hardly serve as an effective legal weapon to
recover China‘s lost sovereign rights and to bar further aggression of
foreign imperialism. Its only conceivable function was as a
diplomatic reference book that the Chinese officials might use to
restrain the ―wild‖ and ―craftiest‖ foreign consuls and avoid
diplomatic blunders.
Of course, another factor that helps explain the Chinese failure to
use international law in recovering China‘s lost rights and asserting
its sovereign equality and independence was the attitude of Western
powers toward international law in their relations with China. In this
respect, the prevailing view of the West in the nineteenth century was
much like the antique Chinese zoning theory in that ―humanity in its
present condition divides itself into three concentric zones or
spheres—that of civilized humanity, that of barbarous humanity and
that of savage humanity.‖121
To these three zones, or spheres, the ―civilized nations‖ accorded
three types of recognitions: ―plenary political recognition, partial
political recognition and natural or mere human recognition.‖122 The
sphere of plenary political recognition extended to European and
American states, along with their colonies that were inhabited by
white men.123 The sphere of partial political recognition extended to
Turkey, Persia, China, Siam, and Japan.124 The rest of mankind
120. HSÜ, ENTRANCE, supra note 11, at 144.
121. 1 JAMES LORIMER, INSTITUTES OF LAW OF NATIONS: A TREATISE OF JURAL RELATIONS
OF SEPARATE POLITICAL COMMUNITIES 101 (1883).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 101–02.
124. Id. at 102.
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belonged to the sphere of mere human recognition: ―It is with the first
of these spheres alone that the international jurist has directly to
deal.‖125 Countries like China did not belong to the category of the
so-called ―civilized‖ nations, which were not bound to apply the
positive law of nations to savages or even to barbarians as such.126
As alleged by the 1916 edition of Wheaton‘s Elements of
International Law, China ―lacks certain attributes essential to regular
and complete membership of the family of States, governed by, and
enjoying the privileges of, the system of general international law.‖127
Oppenheim in his 1905 edition of International Law affirmed this
view, except that he down-graded the position of China even
further.128 He divided states into five classes: (1) European states; (2)
American states, Liberia and Haiti; (3) Turkey; (4) Japan; (5) Persia,
Siam, China, Korea, and Abyssinia.129 As to the fifth class, he
remarked:
However, their civilization has not yet reached that
condition which is necessary to enable their governments
and their population in every respect to understand and to
carry out the command of the rules of International Law.130
Based on this Eurocentric theory, which justified Western
imperialist and colonial expansion, the ―uncivilized‖ were excluded
from the operation and benefits of the whole system of international
law. The Western powers introduced this Western legal learning into
China, but they did so only as part of their efforts to destroy the
traditional Chinese world order and place China under the
domination of the Western world order. As a contemporary Chinese
historian puts it, the Western powers attempted make the Chinese
follow the rules that a semi-colonial state was supposed to follow.131
As early as 1834, Lord Napier of Great Britain advised his
government before his death: ―I feel satisfied your lordship will see
the urgent necessity of negotiating with such a [Chinese] government,
having in your hands at the same time the means of compulsion; to

125.
126.
127.
1916).
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.
WHEATON‘S ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (Coleman Phillipson ed., 5th ed.
Chen, supra note 7, at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4–5.
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negotiate with them otherwise would be an idle waste of time.‖132
These words would guide the action of foreign imperialists in their
expansion and aggression in China. Every foreign government—
British, French, Russian, German, or Japanese—that had come in
conflict with China from 1839 to 1945 followed these words.
Thus, in their actual pursuit of interests in China, foreign
imperialist powers rarely took international law into account. They
first opened China, put down its resistance by force, and then
imposed on it unequal treaties at gun point. They conducted all
relations with China by reference to these unequal treaties. Although
their demands were often couched in terms of the Western system of
international law, they never intended to apply the law to their
relations with China as they did among themselves. Their application
of international law can only be interpreted as being based upon the
belief that China had no rights worth their respect and that they were
free to impose upon China their terms, which had to be accepted
without China‘s demur. It was against this background that
international law was first formally introduced into China. It was not
an easy introduction. It was nothing less than a traumatic encounter
that created lasting memories of humiliation, domination, and
oppression by foreign powers under the unequal treaty regime.
Paradoxical as it may seem, international law, so vital and
beneficial to the relations among states with a European background,
proved more destructive than constructive to the Chinese. Having
experienced decades of foreign aggression and humiliation, the
Chinese could hardly find reasons to trust that the Western powers
would apply international law in an even-handed manner while
dealing with China.
It was the challenge of survival in the face of national
subjugation and extinction at the hands of Western imperialism that
forced the Chinese to accept such international law concepts as
sovereignty, nation, state, independence, and equality. In the Chinese
quest for national salvation and regeneration, external aggression as
invited by the internal decay became a focal point. Hence, the
Chinese made serious efforts to bring international law into full play
in their struggle to shake off the yoke of the unequal treaty regime
and to create and maintain a strong and unified China—a China that
is no longer the ―central realm‖ based on Confucian culture, but a
nation state with a rightful place in the family of nations.
132. CHONG SU SEE, THE FOREIGN TRADE OF CHINA 125 (1919).
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Today‘s achievements are built upon yesterday‘s experience.
The Chinese are a history-conscious people. Given the state‘s pivotal
role in advancing China‘s cultural greatness and in maintaining its
territorial integrity, contrasted with a century of foreign humiliation,
oppression, and domination, the Chinese sovereignty-centric
perspective on international law is hardly surprising. Indeed, ever
since the overthrow of the Qing dynasty and the subsequent founding
of the republic in 1911, the ability to maintain China‘s sovereignty
over its internal and external affairs has become the raison d’être of
any Chinese government, regardless of ideological persuasions.133
Today, the teaching, research, and dissemination of international law
has become part of China‘s efforts of a peaceful rise. The perennial
concern with its status, security, and territorial sovereignty, as shaped
by its historical legacies, still affects China‘s legal behavior in the
conduct of its foreign relations.

133. It is remembered that, even during the heyday of Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s,
Chinese leaders made it clear that China‘s policy was to form an alliance on the basis of
sovereign equality and independence rather than a petition for membership in the bloc.
Premier Zhou Enlai repeatedly admonished that:
the Chinese people must use their own brain for thinking and their own legs for
walking. . . . We adhere to a basic position in the conduct of China‘s foreign
affairs . . . that is to maintain China‘s national independence. No country is
permitted to intervene in China‘s internal affairs.
Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao [Diplomacy in Contemporary China] 30 (Xue Mouhong ed.,
1986).

